How China’s Investigator-Initiated Pathway Is Rewriting the Validation Trajectory for Cell/Tissue Targeted Medicines
A perfect storm
In September 2025, the New England Journal of Medicine published as Correspondence the first clinical data that would have seemed implausible five years ago1. Five patients with refractory systemic lupus erythematosus had received an intravenous infusion containing messenger RNA encoding a CD19 chimeric antigen receptor, packaged inside a lipid nanoparticle engineered to deliver its cargo specifically to T cells. The patients’ own T cells, reprogrammed in their own bodies, attacked the B cells driving the disease. Four of the five had lupus nephritis. All showed deep B-cell depletion. None needed the toxic chemotherapy conditioning that conventional CAR-T therapy requires.
The drug was called HN2301. The company was MagicRNA, based in Shenzhen. The trial was an investigator-initiated study (IIT) — meaning the local hospital ethics committee, not China’s national drug regulator, had cleared it. From a regulatory standpoint, it was the kind of trial a clinician runs to test a hypothesis. From a scientific standpoint, it was the first published clinical evidence that you can manufacture CAR-T cells inside a patient’s body.
In March 2025, AstraZeneca had paid up to a billion dollars to acquire a small Belgian biotech called EsoBiotec. The asset that justified the price was a similar in vivo CAR-T concept, ESO-T01 — co-developed with Shenzhen’s Pregene Biopharma — whose first patient had been dosed in November 2024 at Union Hospital in Wuhan, part of the Tongji Medical College system at Huazhong University of Science and Technology, under principal investigator Heng Mei. The trial was multi-center, investigator-initiated, with a planned enrollment of up to 24 patients with relapsed/refractory multiple myeloma. The dosing was announced publicly on January 8, 2025. Two months later, AstraZeneca acquired the company.
In late April 2025, a Shanghai company called YolTech reported interim results from its own investigator-initiated trial of YOLT-101, an in vivo base editor for heterozygous familial hypercholesterolemia, in which the company’s proprietary adenine base editor2 — packaged in a GalNAc-conjugated lipid nanoparticle (LNP)— converts a single nucleotide in the PCSK9 gene of hepatocytes. The trial run at Renji Hospital of Shanghai Jiao Tong University, had enrolled six subjects across three dose cohorts. PCSK9 levels fell by more than 70% from baseline in the higher-dose groups. LDL cholesterol reductions were durable through at least 24 weeks of follow-up, with the longest individual reaching 36 weeks. Five weeks after the data readout the U.S. FDA cleared YolTech’s investigational new drug application to run the same study in the United States.
These are not isolated events. The industry is very rapidly evolving. First-in-human (FIH) means something completely different today than what it meant even a year or two back. These events are just the surf from the turbulent waves that has left US biotech reeling. This is quietly becoming the fastest path for a new molecule or a novel therapeutic idea to race to to interpretable human data. To understand why this matters — for patients, for investors, and for anyone designing the next generation of cell-targeted medicines — you have to understand the system that produced them.
Two tracks to First-in-Humans
Since 2017, China has run a dual-track regulatory system for cell and gene therapies. One track is the conventional one: an industry-sponsored Investigational New Drug application reviewed by China’s NMPA. This is the rough equivalent of the U.S. FDA’s Center for Drug Evaluation and Research (CDER). The other track is the Investigator-Initiated Trial, or IIT, overseen by China’s National Health Commission and gated only by an institutional ethics committee at a licensed hospital.
The IIT is not unique to China. The United States has investigator-initiated studies too. What is unique is the combination of three things:
- The legal status of IITs as a recognized regulatory pathway for novel modalities including cell and gene therapy
- The scale of the Chinese hospital system willing to run them
- The data infrastructure to publish and license the products that this system can output.
The financial fingerprint of this system is striking. A analysis published in Frontiers in Pharmacology in early 20263, identified 10,373 cell therapy clinical trials worldwide.
This table says it all!
| Region | Cell therapy trials (Oct 2025) | Phase III share | Early Phase I share |
|---|---|---|---|
| United States | 3,563 | 4.4% | 1.7% |
| China | 3,365 | 1.6% | 21.1% |
| Europe | 1,584 | 10.5% | 0.5% |
What this means is that China is not running the same trials the West runs. China is running a different kind of trial — earlier, smaller, more exploratory, less expensive — at enormous volume. An earlier analysis of 953 Chinese gene-and-cell therapy trials published in 20224 found that investigator-initiated studies “far exceeded” industry-sponsored ones in every category except in vivo gene therapy, where the regulatory bar is structurally higher.
This produces a peculiar economy. Conventional Western drug development assumes that a Phase I trial is a $5–15 million undertaking that takes 12 to 24 months to launch after a successful IND filing. A Chinese IIT for a cell-targeted construct, run at a major academic hospital, can be initiated in 3 to 9 months at a cost of $300,000 to $1.5 million. The EsoBiotec story is the canonical example: hypothesis, registration, first patient, acquisition — three months from human data to a billion-dollar exit.
A second statistical fingerprint sharpens the picture. The same paper found that 43% of China’s cell-therapy trials use genetically modified cell products, meaning, cells engineered with an inserted transgene, edited gene, or both, rather than cells used in their native state. In the United States and the European Union, the genetically-modified share is closer to 19%. The Western cell-therapy portfolio is more heavily weighted toward unmodified modalities: hematopoietic stem-cell transplants, mesenchymal stem cells, tumor-infiltrating lymphocytes. The Chinese portfolio, by contrast, leans hard into constructed cell therapies — CAR-T, CAR-NK, TCR-T, and the in vivo variants of all three. China runs roughly twice the proportion of engineered-cell trials that the West does. Engineered cell therapies are the modality class whose value is determined by the targeting molecule each cell expresses: the CAR’s antigen-binding domain, the TCR’s recognition sequence, the homing peptide on the LNP that delivers the genetic payload. So China is dominating in therapies whose primarily value is in how precisely they find their cellular target.
The modalities that benefit
The IIT pathway is producing first-in-human data across at least eight different modality classes, each of which depends on a different solution to the same underlying problem: how do you get a payload — a gene editor, a piece of RNA, a radioactive atom, a cytotoxic small molecule — into a specific kind of cell?
In vivo CAR-T
This is the modality that has captured the most attention. After MagicRNA’s work are at least three other clinical-stage programs. Genocury Biotech, also in Shenzhen, reported a complete remission in a patient with refractory diffuse large B-cell lymphoma after a single dose of its in vivo CD19 CAR-T. The trial was run at Tongji Hospital in Wuhan under principal investigator Jia Wei. EsoBiotec’s BCMA program is now an AstraZeneca asset. A fourth program, registered in January 2026 by Daihong Liu of the PLA General Hospital in Beijing uses a polymer-lipid hybrid nanoparticle5 to deliver mRNA encoding a dual CD19/CD20 CAR.
In vivo gene editing
YolTech alone now has four programs with human or near-human data. Its base editor for familial hypercholesterolemia, YOLT-101, edits the PCSK9 gene in hepatocytes using a lipid nanoparticle delivery system. Its CRISPR-Cas program YOLT-201 targets the TTR gene in transthyretin amyloid cardiomyopathy. Anyone who has worked in the nucleic acid drug space should be very familiar with these targets! YOLT-203 treats primary hyperoxaluria type 1. YOLT-202, for alpha-1 antitrypsin deficiency, has FDA Regenerative Medicine Advanced Therapy designation. A second Chinese company, AccurEdit, has reported up to 70% LDL-cholesterol reduction from a single dose of its own base-editing therapy. A third, Base Therapeutics in Shanghai, has registered two oncology programs.
What is striking about this cluster is that they are liver focussed where all LNPs accumulate anyway. The clinical successes so far are for liver-expressed targets (PCSK9, TTR, alpha-1 antitrypsin). The frontier — the editing of cells anywhere else in the body — is purely a problem of finding the right targeting ligand.
So US biotech can still innovate. The bottleneck on every in vivo gene editor is the same — targeting to cells and tissues. Wouldn’t it be amazing if we could specifically target the brain, muscle & cardiac tissues, immune system, or any solid tumor? What if we could efficiently design peptides, aptamers, or a polymeric system that can decorate the LNP and redirect it?
In fact, aptamers form a third cluster, dominated almost single-handedly by the laboratory of Weihong Tan, now at the Hangzhou Institute of Medicine. In 2023, the Tan group published the first-in-human pharmacokinetic study of a synthetic DNA aptamer in Research, a Science Partner Journal6. The aptamer, called SGC8, was radiolabeled with gallium-68 via a NOTA chelator and injected intravenously into cancer patients at Renji Hospital in Shanghai under hospital ethics committee approval. It bound the cell-surface receptor PTK7. It was, in the most literal sense, a designed targeting molecule visualized inside human bodies.
The Tan lab’s more recent work has taken a different turn. A September 2025 preprint described what the group calls Apt-circRNA: a circular RNA molecule with aptamer sequences embedded directly into its structure. I have written about this in an earlier blog post, see here. The aptamer acts as the targeting moiety for the circular RNA payload. There is no lipid nanoparticle. There is no carrier of any kind. The construct is both the medicine and the address it travels to. In mice, the Apt-circRNA, loaded with tumor antigen, drove antigen presentation in dendritic cells and cleared established tumors.
Radioligand Therapies
This is fourth cluster and arguably has the lowest-friction to get human data for a new targeting polymers. Chinese nuclear medicine departments routinely run investigator-initiated trials of novel peptide ligands labeled with diagnostic or therapeutic isotopes. A paper published in the Journal of Medicinal Chemistry in early 2026 described the first-in-human evaluation of a novel PSMA-targeting radioligand whose key feature was a modified amino acid — a beta-3 amino linker — designed to reduce off-target uptake in the kidneys and salivary glands7.
The trial was first-in-human and IIT. An EJNMMI paper from October 2025 described an investigator-initiated dose-escalation trial of a fibroblast-activation-protein-targeted radioligand in patients with advanced sarcoma and other refractory cancers. Another such trial is running at Nanjing First Hospital.
The drug-conjugate families — ADC, peptide-drug conjugates, antibody-oligonucleotide conjugates, radionuclide conjugates, small-molecule drug conjugates, immunostimulatory antibody conjugates, antibody-degrader conjugates — all share the same three-part architecture: a targeting ligand, a linker, an effector. Targets are appearing in Chinese trials before they appear in Western ones.
mRNA and circRNA cancer vaccines form a fifth cluster, where the targeting question is whether the antigen-coding RNA reaches the right antigen-presenting cell. StemiRNA Therapeutics in Shanghai has received CDE approval for SW0715, a lipopolyplex-formulated mRNA encoding IL-12 — a lipid-polymer hybrid carrier. Academic groups at Fudan, Tsinghua, and Mengchao Hepatobiliary are running circRNA neoantigen vaccine programs against hepatocellular carcinoma and HPV-driven cancers.
What unites these clusters is not a shared technology, instead a shared innovaiton bottleneck. In every case the value-creating element of the medicine is the molecule that directs it to its cellular destination. The CAR, the aptamer, the targeting peptide on a radioligand, the antibody on a conjugate, the engineered envelope of a virus, the surface protein of an exosome, the ligand on a lipid nanoparticle. Designing these targeting molecules is the rate-limiting step. Validating them in humans is the value-creating step. And it is the latter that the Chinese IIT pathway has compressed by an order of magnitude.
The mechanics of how it all moves so fast
How does a Chinese IIT actually move so fast? It is worth understanding the mechanics.
Three structural factors do most of the work.
The first is hospital sponsorship. An IIT in China is sponsored by the institution running it — typically the principal investigator and the hospital’s clinical research unit. The investigator submits a protocol to the hospital’s ethics committee, which assesses safety, scientific rationale, and ethical considerations. If the committee approves, the trial can proceed. There is no parallel review by NMPA, no IND filing, no requirement for a sponsor company.
The legal sponsor is the investigator. This eliminates an entire layer of regulatory interaction that, in the United States, typically consumes 12 to 18 months between protocol design and first patient dosed.
The second is the sheer density of the hospital infrastructure. Twenty-five percent of the world’s top 200 research hospitals by Nature Index share are in China. Many of the major academic centers — Renji Hospital, Tongji Hospital, PLA General Hospital, Peking Union Medical College Hospital, Fudan Zhongshan, Nanjing First — have established cell therapy and gene therapy units with experienced clinical research staff, on-site manufacturing capacity, and ethics committees that have evaluated dozens of novel-modality protocols.
The third is cost. Clinical operations in China cost roughly 30 to 40 percent of equivalent operations in the United States — and for early-phase exploratory trials with small patient cohorts and short follow-up, the multiple can stretch further. CRO labor, hospital bed-days, GMP manufacturing, all are systematically less expensive. A small IIT can be funded out of a company’s seed-stage budget. A Phase I IND in the U.S. typically cannot.
China’s NMPA has joined the International Council for Harmonization, which has the effect of aligning Chinese review standards with international ones for trials that do graduate to industry-sponsored status. Beijing announced in April 2025 that it would process investigational drug applications in 30 working days, down from 60. The ecosystem there has been actively engineered to compress timelines, whereas US has fought against mRNA vaccines and tech.
The result is a kind of clinical-development arbitrage that did not exist five years ago. A biotech founder with a novel cell-targeting construct now has a choice. Path A is the conventional one: raise $20–30 million in a Series A, spend two years and another $10–20 million on IND-enabling studies, file an IND with the FDA, recruit U.S. sites, and wait. Path B is the new one: design the construct, find an academic principal investigator at a Chinese hospital who shares the scientific interest, fund a small IIT, and dose your first patient inside of nine months for under a million dollars. The data from Path B will not get you a U.S. approval. But it will tell you, with real human evidence, whether your construct works.
For an investor that distinction changes the entire risk profile. The biggest question in early-stage biotech investing is whether the company’s preclinical model translates to humans. A team who can answer that question with human data — even exploratory, even small — is selling a fundamentally different proposition than a team who can only point to mice. Welcome to the brave new world of drug discovery!
The deal-side perspective
The translation of this scientific reality into commercial activity has been swift, but it has taken two distinct forms — and the difference between them reveals where the industry is heading.
The EsoBiotec story is the cleanest small-scale example. In December 2024 the company initiated an investigator-initiated trial of ESO-T01 at multiple Chinese sites. The first patient was dosed in January 2025. In March 2025 AstraZeneca acquired the company for up to a billion dollars in cash and milestones. The asset that justified the price was not a Phase I dataset in the traditional sense — it was a small, IIT-derived signal that in-vivo CAR-T could work for multiple myeloma. AstraZeneca did not need a U.S.-quality IND package. It needed conviction.
The most consequential transaction of 2025, however, was something larger and structurally different. On July 28, 2025, GSK announced an agreement with Jiangsu Hengrui Pharma — one of China’s largest pharmaceutical companies — to develop up to twelve innovative medicines across respiratory, immunology, inflammation, and oncology. GSK paid $500 million upfront. The total potential value, if all twelve programs are optioned and all milestones met, is approximately $12 billion, plus tiered royalties on global sales outside Greater China. The lead asset is HRS-9821, a PDE3/4 inhibitor in clinical development for chronic obstructive pulmonary disease. The other eleven programs are not yet in the clinic; Hengrui will develop each of them through Phase I, including the recruitment of patients outside China, and GSK holds the option to take any of them global at the end of each Phase I.
The structure of the GSK-Hengrui deal says something the industry has been moving toward but rarely articulates so clearly: a top-five global pharma is treating a Chinese pharma’s discovery and early-clinical engine as a strategic source of pipeline. Not as a one-off vendor of a single asset but a portfolio builder.
The financial structure mirrors the scientific reality: the value-creating step — getting a new molecule into a human and seeing what it does — is being run in China.
A second, parallel transaction in the same year traced a longer arc and made the same point in a different way. In November 2023, BioNTech licensed the ex-China rights to a bispecific antibody called PM8002 from Biotheus, a Zhuhai-based biotech founded in 2018, for $55 million upfront. In November 2024, BioNTech acquired Biotheus outright for $800 million plus $150 million in milestones, gaining global rights to the molecule it had renamed BNT327. In June 2025, BioNTech licensed BNT327 to Bristol Myers Squibb for $1.5 billion upfront, $2 billion in fixed payments through 2028, and up to $7.6 billion in milestones — a total deal value of up to $11.1 billion. BNT327 targets PD-L1 and VEGF-A simultaneously, an approach that early data suggest could outperform Merck’s Keytruda, the world’s best-selling drug. It is now in global Phase III trials for small-cell and non-small-cell lung cancer, with a triple-negative breast cancer trial slated for late 2025 and more than a thousand patients dosed across some twenty studies.
The arithmetic on BNT327 is worth dwelling on. A bispecific antibody developed in a Chinese biotech moved from a $55 million license to a deal worth up to $11.1 billion in less than two years — a more than 200-fold appreciation in stated transaction value.
The story continues. Merck paid up to $3.288 billion to license LM-299, another PD-1/VEGF bispecific, from China’s LaNova Medicines. AbbVie’s $2.1 billion acquisition of Capstan Therapeutics in 2025, for in vivo CAR-T lipid nanoparticle technology, was driven by precisely the modality MagicRNA had just published on. Lilly’s $2.2 billion January 2026 licensing deal with Profluent was for AI-designed CRISPR delivery components — the kind of asset that would naturally be validated in a Chinese IIT before any U.S. registrational study. Moderna signed a deal worth up to $1 billion in May 2025 to establish mRNA manufacturing and trials in China.
This an emergent two-track pattern of pharmaceutical business development that did not exist five years ago.
- Track one is the asset purchase: a Western acquirer pays for a specific Chinese-validated molecule, sometimes through an intermediary
- Track two is the portfolio collaboration: a Western pharma buys access to a Chinese discovery and early-clinical engine across multiple programs simultaneously, with optionality at the Phase I gate. The GSK-Hengrui deal is the canonical example.
Both tracks move capital westward, but the underlying architecture is the same — Chinese clinical validation, Western commercial valuation, and the arbitrage between them as the largest single source of pharma deal-making.
If you map the modified-polymer and cell-targeted therapeutics deals announced from 2023 through early 2026, the total upfront-plus-milestone value crosses $89 billion. In a growing number of cases, the first interpretable human data on that targeting molecule comes from a Chinese hospital, the molecule itself was discovered in a Chinese biotech, or both.
But it need not be so. US Biotech can innovate and still leverage both of these tracks.
So where do we go next as a biotech founder?
If a biotech founder reading this wants to ruminate on possible paths, here we go:
- Identify the principal investigator before the protocol. The most productive entry points are academic clinicians who have already run novel-modality IITs and whose research interests align with the construct in question.
- China has one of the world’s deepest contract manufacturing benches for modified peptides, modified oligonucleotides, and conjugates. Worth considering for material sourcing, GMP etc. I have worked extensively in India for this.
- Scope out the regulatory boundaries. Two things matter here. The first is the Human Genetic Resources rule, updated by NHC in April 2024, which requires approval for any foreign access to Chinese-origin human genetic data. The second is the question of how the resulting IIT data will be used downstream — exploratory signal for the next funding round, supporting data for a U.S. IND filing, or asset-level validation for a strategic partnership. A founder who plans to use IIT data to anchor an acquisition needs to run the trial to a higher standard than one who plans only to use it for internal go/no-go.
- Budget considerations: A focused FIH IIT for a cell-targeted construct, with five to fifteen patients and a defined primary endpoint, can usually be done for between $500,000 and $1.5 million all-in, including manufacturing of the clinical-grade material. A bridging Phase 1 in the United States will cost an order of magnitude more.
- Chinese IIT data is exploratory by FDA and EMA standards. It does not, on its own, substitute for an IND-quality safety dataset for a U.S. filing.
Why this matters for the design of new medicines
The deeper story underneath the regulatory mechanics is a story about what kind of science the system rewards.
For most of the history of biotech, the bottleneck was the drug. You found a target. You discovered a molecule. You spent years and hundreds of millions of dollars proving the molecule was safe and effective. Validation was slow because the molecules were slow to design.
The molecules are becoming faster to design, though chemically modified ones are still very much a challenge. AI, computational chemistry methods for modified-polymer design are catching up fast. The bottleneck has moved upstream of synthesis: it is now the question of which molecules to design, which targets to hit on which cells. The bottleneck has also moved downstream: it is now the question of how quickly you can validate any one design in a human being.
China’s IIT system attacks the downstream bottleneck. It does not solve the upstream one. An innovator who wants to use the system productively still has to know which cell-surface protein to target on which tissue, and still has to design a molecule that will bind it well. But once those choices are made, the system shortens the validation cycle from years to months and from tens of millions of dollars to less than two.
This compression has consequences that ripple outward. It changes the economics of biotech seed financing — a company can credibly aim for human data on a milestone budget. It changes the structure of pharma business development — assets become acquisition candidates earlier in their development, on smaller datasets, demanding that we ask altogether different questions. It changes the pace of competitive dynamics — a Chinese in vivo CAR-T company can publish in NEJM before a U.S. competitor has dosed its first patient.
And it changes which scientific problems are worth attempting in the first place. If validation takes ten years and a hundred million dollars, you choose your targets conservatively. If validation takes a year and a million dollars, you can try things that previously would have been unjustifiable.
This last shift is the most important and the least discussed. The Chinese IIT pathway, applied at scale to cell-targeted medicine, is making it economically rational to design medicines for cellular addresses that no one has ever tried to deliver to before. The map of drugged cell-surface proteins on the human body is small — fewer than a dozen targets across the entire receptorome have been engaged by approved cell-targeted therapeutics. The map of potential targets is enormous, in the low thousands of cell-surface proteins. The arbitrage between those two numbers — between what has been done and what could be done — is what defines the next decade of cell-targeted medicine, and it is the IIT pathway that makes the arbitrage economically practicable.
A measured caveat
There are real risks in this story, and a fair-minded reader should know them.
China’s IIT data is not registrational data, and treating it as such has burned investors before. The quality of IIT trials varies widely: the major academic centers run them to international GCP standards, but smaller hospitals do not always. An innovator building a serious clinical program will need a Western regulatory consultant in the loop from day one, not as an afterthought when the IIT data lands.
The BIOSECURE Act, the U.S. legislation restricting federal contracts with certain Chinese biotech firms, remains in effect through 2026 and creates real friction for companies that intend to repatriate Chinese-developed assets to U.S. commercialization. A company planning to use the Chinese pathway should also plan a non-Chinese manufacturing footprint for any commercially bound asset.
The Human Genetic Resources rule complicates how IIT-derived human data flows into joint development agreements with Western pharma. Companies that fail to scope this early have lost deals over it.
Geopolitical risk is real and difficult to model. The same conditions that make the IIT pathway fast — institutional density, regulatory flexibility, low cost — sit on top of a U.S.-China relationship that is not stable.
The calm after the storm?
If the trajectory of the past three years continues — and there is little structural reason to expect it not to — three things will be visible from the outside by 2027.
First, the headline first-in-human data for the next wave of cell-targeted modalities will increasingly come out of Chinese hospitals.
Second, the deal-making patterns will see seismic shifts. Strategic acquirers will increasingly underwrite assets at the IIT data stage, not at the Phase I-complete stage. The size and shape of biotech Series A and Series B rounds will shift to accommodate this. A company that previously needed $80 million to get to a Phase 1 data readout may now need $25 million to get to IIT data plus a bridging plan. The implications for venture-stage biotech investing are large and under-appreciated.
Third, the choice of which targets to attempt will broaden. The hardest problem in cell-targeted medicine has always been identifying which receptors on which cells are worth the years and dollars of a development cycle. As that cycle shortens, the answer shifts from the same dozen targets everyone else is chasing to any target with a defensible scientific rationale and a designable targeting ligand. Foundation-model approaches to molecule design — for antibodies, for peptides, for aptamers, for chemically modified polymers — pair naturally with this expansion. A platform that can rapidly generate targeting molecules against new cell-surface antigens, combined with rapid lab-in-a-loop and regulatory pathway that can rapidly test them in humans, is a different kind of business than the biotechs of the prior generation.
A note on sources
- Wang Q, Xiao ZX, Zheng X, Wang G, Zha GF, Schett G, Chen Z, et al. “In Vivo CD19 CAR T-Cell Therapy for Refractory Systemic Lupus Erythematosus.“ New England Journal of Medicine. Published September 17, 2025. ↩︎
- Wan P, Tang S, Lin D, Lu Y, Long M, Xiao L, Jiang Y, Liao J, Ma X, Liu Y, Yu W, Wang ZJ, Wu Y, Yang T, Xia Q. “Base Editing Gene Therapy for Heterozygous Familial Hypercholesterolemia.” medRxiv 2025.04.17.25325983. Posted April 17, 2025. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1101/2025.04.17.25325983 ↩︎
- Wang M, Zhou T, Liu S, Xiang W, Xie K, Zhang X, Hu W, Fang M, Zhang Z, Chen M, Wang X, Wu J. “Global Panoramic analysis of clinical research in cell therapy: clinical trial landscape, marketed products, and regulatory trends.” Frontiers in Pharmacology, 9 February 2026. DOI: 10.3389/fphar.2026.1715984. ↩︎
- Yin C, Gao J, Li G, Hu H, Zhou L, Lu S, Chen X. “Gene and cell therapies in China: booming landscape under dual-track regulation.” J Hematol Oncol. 2022;15(1):139. doi:10.1186/s13045-022-01354-9. PMC: PMC9535931. ↩︎
- ClinicalTrials.gov. “Polymer-lipid Particle-delivered CAR1920 mRNA CAR-T (InViVoCAR1920) for B-cell Lymphoma/Leukemia.” Identifier: NCT07321301. Sponsor-investigator: Daihong Liu, Chinese PLA General Hospital, Beijing. Registered January 7, 2026. https://clinicaltrials.gov/study/NCT07321301 ↩︎
- Ding D, Zhao H, Wei D, Yang Q, Yang C, Wang R, Chen Y, Li L, An S, Xia Q, Huang G, Liu J, Xiao Z, Tan W. “The First-in-Human Whole-Body Dynamic Pharmacokinetics Study of Aptamer.” Research (a Science Partner Journal). 2023;6:0126. ↩︎
- Gao X, Miao Y, Li L, et al. “Synthesis, Evaluation, and First-in-Human Study of a Novel PSMA Radioligand Bearing Beta3-Amino Acid Linkage.” J Med Chem. 2026;69(5):5610-5621. doi:10.1021/acs.jmedchem.5c02821 ↩︎













